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CHAPTER 5 
Commercial Law 
CHARLES CRAIG 
§5.1. Minor errors in financing statements. During the 1971 
SuRVEY year the Supreme Judicial Court was presented with its first 
case involving UCC Section 9-402(5): 1 "A financing statement sub-
stantially complying with the requirements of this section is effective 
though it contains minor errors which are not seriously misleading." 
In Still Associates, Inc. v. Murphy,2 the Court correctly decided that 
the minor error in the financing statement had not misled or preju-
diced those who had relied on the financing statement. A thorough 
discussion of the Still decision and UCC §9-402(5) is included in the 
student comment, §5.9 infra. 
§5.2. Sale: Acceptance of goods; Rejection of goods; Revocation 
of acceptance; Warranty. In Axion Corp. v. G.D.C. Leasing Corp., 1 
there were three sales transactions between the parties, each relating 
to an expensive valve-testing machine of sophisticated design. The 
three machines were delivered, and two of them were paid for, but the 
defendant buyer refused payment for the third valve-tester. In consol-
idated actions, the seller sued to compel payment for the third machine, 
and the buyer alleged damages for the seller's breach of express and 
implied warranties as to each of the three machines. The trial court 
entered directed verdicts for the seller. 
On appeal, the threshold question for the Supreme Judicial Court 
was whether the third machine had been accepted or rejected under 
the code. The seller contended that the second and third machines, 
which were ordered, delivered, and tested together, constituted one 
"commercial unit,"2 so that acceptance of the second machine con-
stituted acceptance of the commercial unit under UCC §2-606(2): 
"Acceptance of a part of any commercial unit is acceptance of that 
entire unit." Section 2-606(2), however, applies only where both the 
CHARLES CRAIG is a partner in the firm of Craig & Craig, Boston. 
§5.1. I The vee was enacted as Chapter 106 of the Massachusetts General Laws. 
Because corresponding section numbers are identical, all references, unless otherwise 
indicated, are to the 1962 Official Text of the Uniform Commercial Code. 
21971 Mass. Adv. Sh. 245,267 N.E.2d217. 
§5.2. 1 1971 Mass.Adv.Sh.817,269N.E.2d664. 
2 UCC §2-105(6): " 'Commercial unit' means such a unit of goods as by commercial 
usage is a single whole for purposes of sale and division of which materially impairs its 
character or value on the market or in use. A commercial unit may be a single article (as a 
machine) or a set of articles .... " 
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goods and the tender of delivery conform to the contract. If there is 
nonconformance, Section 2-60l(c) permits the buyer to "accept any 
commercial unit or units and reject the rest," and the definition of 
commercial unit includes a single machine.3 If the buyer had won on 
its breach of warranty claim as to the third machine, it would have 
shown a nonconformance which could have entitled it to reject that 
machine. 
Although the Court found that there had been no breach of war-
ranty, it nonetheless rejected the seller's contention that the second 
and third valve-testers had comprised a commercial unit. Without 
reference to the definition of commercial unit as including a single 
machine, the Court looked to the nature of the goods. Observing, for 
example, that the seller had taken back the third machine separately 
for further work, the Court concluded: 
There is no evidence that there was a commercial usage to treat 
two machines as a single whole or that division of a pair of ma-
chines materially impaired their character or value, or that ac-
ceptance of one produced a materially adverse effect on the other.4 
Thus the test employed in this case appears to be one of good faith and 
commercial reasonableness,5 so that undue signifl.cance is not attached 
to the grouping of goods when ordered and delivered. 
Having failed to show acceptance of the third machine under Sec-
tion 2-606(2), the seller prevailed on his alternative theory: the buyer's 
failure to make an effective rejection. Under UCC §2-606(l)(b), the 
goods are considered accepted if the buyer fails to make an effective 
rejection; and under UCC §2-602(1 ), a rejection of goods, in order to 
be effective, must occur within a reasonable time after delivery or tender 
and must include a seasonable notice to the seller. Since in this case 
the buyer gave notice of rejection to the seller more than one year 
after receipt of the machine, the Supreme Judicial Court held, as a 
matter of law, that the notification was not seasonable and the rejec-
tion was not within a reasonable time.6 
Once goods have been accepted, a buyer becomes obligated to pay 
for them at the contract price.7 Yet under appropriate circumstances 
he may revoke his acceptance and have the same rights as if he had 
effectively rejected the goods.8 Under UCC §2-608, the basic require-
3 Ibid. 
4 1971 Mass. Adv. Sh. 817,820,269 N.E.2d664, 667. 
5 See UCC §2-601, Comment I. 
6 See UCC §2-602, Comment I. See also Miron v. Yonkers Raceway, Inc., 400 F.2d 112, 
118-119 (2d Cir. 1968); Campbell v. Pollack, 101 R.I. 223, 230, 221 A.2d 615, 619 (1966). 
7 UCC§2-607(1). 
8 UCC §2-608 provides in part: 
"(I) The buyer may revoke his acceptance of a lot or commercial unit whose non-con-
formity substantially impairs its value to him if he has accepted it 
"(a) on the reasonable assumption that its non-conformity would be cured and it has 
not been seasonably cured; or 
"(b) without discovery of such non-conformity if his acceptance was reasonably in-
2
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ments for revocation of acceptance are that the goods be nonconform-
ing and that the nonconformity substantially impair their value to the 
buyer. In Axion the Court found the evidence insufficient to show 
substantial impairment of value. As a consequence, the seller could 
recover the contract price under Section 2-709(l)(a), subject to any 
offsetting claim for damages by the buyer under Section 2-714. 
Having failed to show effective rejection or revocation of acceptance, 
the buyer was left with nothing but its claim for damages for breach 
of warranties. Since the machines were semi-experimental in nature, 
and since no affirmation of fact or promise as to particular perfor-
mance standards had been shown, the Court rejected the claim of an 
express warranty.9 As to an implied warranty of merchantability, 10 
the Court noted that the machines clearly were capable of setting valves, 
even if they did not set the valves within a tolerance of plus or minus 
5 percent. " 'The requirement when it exists that goods shall be mer-
chantable does not require that the goods shall be of first quality . 
. . .' "II A claim as to an implied warranty of fitness for a particu-
lar purpose12 was also rejected. The Court concluded that the buyer 
had been actively involved in the design of the valve-tester and had not 
relied on the seller's skill or judgment in the production of machines 
that would operate within a particular tolerance. 
Under the Uniform Commercial Code, a buyer faced with a tender of 
goods can accept them, reject them, or accept and later revoke his ac-
ceptance. Axion illustrates some of the significant practical differences 
between the remedies of rejection and revocation of acceptance. 13 The 
most significant is that the course chosen by the buyer will determine 
who has the burden of proof. When the buyer rejects, the seller must 
prove that the goods and tender were conforming; but when the buyer 
revokes his acceptance, it is he who must prove that a breach or defect 
existed at the time of delivery. 14 Another significant difference be-
tween the remedies concerns the degree of nonconformity which a 
buyer must prove. Any breach in either the tender of delivery or the 
goods themselves is sufficient to make a rejection effective, but for the 
buyer to revoke his acceptance, the defect must substantially impair 
the value of the goods to him. Finally, as Axion makes clear, a buyer 
cannot force goods back upon the seller, either by rejection or by 
revocation of acceptance, once a "reasonable time" has elapsed. The 
duced either by the difficulty of discovery before acceptance or by the seller's assurances." 
9UCC§2-313. 
IOUCC§2-314. 
11 1971 Mass. Adv. Sh. 817, 825, 269 N.E.2d 664, 670, quoting Williston, Sales §243 
(rev. ed. 1948). 
l2 ucc §2-315. 
13 For a general discussion, see Note, Rejection or Revocation under the Uniform Com-
mercial Code, 31 Ohio St. L.J. 151 (1970). 
14 "Thus the principal effects of acceptance are to shift the burden of proof and to 
subject the buyer's rights to the limitations stated in [UCC] §2-608." 1971 Mass. Adv. Sh. 
817, 821-822, 269 N.E.2d 664, 668. See UCC §2-607(4). 
3
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issue of what is a reasonable time is to be determined by all the facts 
of the case, and a court will look particularly at contract terms relating 
to inspection of the goods by the buyer after delivery. 
§5.3. Guaranty: Snelling v. State Street Bank and Trust Co. 1 This 
case arose in an equity petition in the Suffolk County Probate Court. 
One of three coguarantors of a loan sought a declaratory judgment 
and other relief as against the other two coguarantors and the creditor, 
the Small Business Administration (SBA). SBA had made a loan to the 
principal debtor, Plymouth Bay Packing Company (Plymouth), se-
cured by a mortgage of Plymouth's properties and a security interest 
in its inventory. Plaintiff was the personal representative of her de-
ceased husband. Plaintiff's intestate and two of the defendants gave 
a joint and several guaranty of the loan to SBA on a form customarily 
required by that agency. Mr. Snelling gave security to SBA for his 
guaranty, but the guaranty obligations of the other two coguarantors 
were unsecured. When Plymouth subsequently went into bankruptcy 
and its secured assets were sold for less than enough to cover the loan, 
the resulting deficiency gave rise to two separate sets of controversies: 
one between SBA and the guarantors and the other among the three 
coguarantors themselves. 
As between SBA and the guarantors, the probate court erroneously 
entered a decree requiring each guarantor to pay one-third of the loan 
deficiency. On the appeal of SBA, the Supreme Judicial Court cor-
rectly held that SBA was entitled to full recovery from any of the guar-
antors.2 Of course, there could be only one satisfaction, but if one 
guarantor paid more than his share, he was relegated to his right of 
contribution against his coguarantors. SBA was entitled to be paid in 
full from any guarantor, and contribution rights were no concern of 
SBA. The Court found it unnecessary to cite authorities, but relied 
exclusively on the fact that the guaranty was both "joint and several" 
and "unconditional." 
The guarantors raised defenses based on certain actions of SBA, 
including an agreement to·release certain collateral, authorization for 
payment of interest on "standby" debt, and a delay in the liquidation 
of collateral after the bankruptcy of the principal debtor. It is true that 
without waiver or consent by a guarantor, certain acts or omissions 
of a creditor can discharge or modify the obligation of the guarantor. 
Where, for example, the creditor and principal debtor substitute an 
entirely new obligation, or materially change the old one, the guar-
antor is discharged.3 However, in this transaction SBA had followed 
the prudent practice of incorporating into the guaranty some compre-
hensive waivers of possible defenses relating to changes in the inci-
dents of the debt. The language of the guaranty gave the SBA full 
power, "in its uncontrolled discretion and without notice to the 
undersigned . . . to deal in any manner with the Liabilities and the 
§5.3. 1 1970 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1549,265 N.E.2d350. 
2 Id. at 1557,265 N.E.2dat356. 
3 See generally Restatement of Security §§122-130. 
4
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collateral. " 4 Although the Court did not specifically refer to 
this clause, it may be assumed that an act pursuant to this type of 
prior consent must plausibly be an act constituting "discretion" and 
not be baldly capricious or patently mischievous. Representatives of 
SBA testified that their conduct was a mater of their "wisdom and judg-
ment'' and was "mutually prudent," and this was apparently taken by 
the Court as indicating good faith. 
The second and more complicated set of controversies in Snelling 
involved relationships among the guarantors themselves, particularly 
with respect to exoneration and contribution. Exoneration among 
coguarantors is the right of one coguarantor to have each of his co-
guarantors make a contemporaneous payment to the creditor of his 
appropriate share of the guaranteed obligation.5 Contribution among 
coguarantors is the obligation of one coguarantor to reimburse an-
other coguarantor who has paid to the creditor more than his appro-
priate share.6 The rights to exoneration and contribution are con-
ferred by law rather than contract unless by contract the relationship 
among guarantors is changed, as where one guarantor agrees to be-
come a subguarantor and the other the principal guarantor. In that 
case, the subguarantor is entitled to exoneration and reimbursement 
from the principal guarantor. 
Snelling is authority for the principle that where there are several 
guarantors, as among themselves, each normally has an equal obliga-
tion. That is to say, where there are three coguarantors and one has 
paid the entire debt, each of the others must reimburse the paying guar-
antor one-third of the debt if no contrary arrangement is shown.7 In 
Snelling, however, the defendant guarantors contended that they were 
subsureties and essentially accommodation parties to the plaintiff 
guarantor. There was testimony that Mr. Snelling had told the guar-
antors, in effect, that they would not be called upon to pay anything 
on the loan. The general rule is that two or more sureties bound to 
answer for the same debt are considered cosureties unless the equities 
of the situation impose the principal liability on one of them, or unless 
they agree among themselves that one of them will assume the whole 
4 1970Mass.Adv.Sh.l549, 1550n.2,265N.E.2d350,352n.2. 
5 Restatement of Security§§ 112, 156. 
6 See Nissenberg v. Felleman, 339 Mass. 717, 720, 162 N.E.2d 304, 307 (1959); Restate-
ment of Security§l49. 
7 The Restatement of Security §154 gives rules governing certain variations in the 
computation of contribution. Although not involved in this case, these rules illustrate 
the equitable goals of the contribution concept. For instance, if one coguarantor is in-
solvent, the paying guarantor can, by recourse to equity, require the solvent coguarantors 
to contribute a larger share. Thus if there are three coguarantors, one of which is insol-
vent, and the paying guarantor pays $9000, the other solvent guarantor must contribute 
$4500. Also, where the risks assumed are unequal, the proportionate share is determined 
by the amount of risk assumed by each. Thus, if two persons are guarantors upon a debt 
and one limits his liability to $10,000 and the other to $5000, the former should bear two-
thirds of the ultimate liability. If the debt is $7500 and is paid by the guarantor with the 
greater risk, he can recover $2500 from the other guarantor. 
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duty of performance.s Where there is this relationship of principal 
surety and subsurety, the latter is in the same relation with the princi-
pal surety, as to rights of exoneration and contribution, as a surety is 
to a principal debtor. The Supreme Judicial Court found against the 
defendant guarantors in Snelling, concluding that certain reported con-
versations "do not constitute an agreement that Snelling [the plain-
tiff's intestate] was to be principal guarantor and surety, and that, as 
between him and them, the coguarantors were to be merely subsure-
ties. "9 
Having determined that the defendant guarantors were cosureties 
with Mr. Snelling, the Court was faced with the plaintiff's claim for 
exoneration. The defendant guarantors argued that "as a condition 
precedent to exoneration, Snelling's estate must establish that it will 
be subjected to special hardship and risks if forced to pay the debt to 
SBA before seeking contribution from the coguarantors." 10 The 
Court rejected the argument, observing that nothing in the case relied 
on by the defendants required "proof of special hardship or risks as 
a basis for exoneration."11 Yet the Court's decree ordered contribu-
tion, not exoneration. This course may have been chosen because of a 
feeling that an order for exoneration would unfairly delay realization 
on the loan deficiency by SBA. 
It is unfortunate that the Court made no reference in Snelling to the 
Uniform Commercial Code, for certain provisions of the code could 
properly have been utilized either by direct application or by analogy. 
To interpret the separate instruments signed by the three guarantors, 
the Court could have looked to Section 3-416, which states the com-
mercial understanding given to different words of guaranty. As support 
for the finding that the three parties were in fact coguarantors, Section 
3-416(3) could have been used: "Words of guaranty which do not other-
wise specify guarantee payments"; i.e., full payment by each guarantor. 
As additional support the Court could have cited the code by analogy. 
Section 3-414(2) regulates the liability of indorsers, all of whom have 
signed the same instrument. Such indorsers are liable to one another 
in the order in which their names appear, unless they otherwise agree. 
In other words, if the instrument indicated that the indorsers were to 
be jointly and severally liable, they would in fact be coguarantors. By 
analogy, since each of the instruments signed by the three parties in 
Snelling contained a provision for joint and several liability, the par-
ties could have been held as coguarantors by the terms of their own 
agreement. Since, under the code, the three parties would be coguar-
antors if they had all signed the same instrument, a different finding 
should not result in the Snelling situation merely because the parties 
had signed separate agreements. 
The Court could also have referred to the UCC when discussing 
8 Restatemento£Security§l46. 
9 1970 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1549, 1554-1555, 265 N .E.2d 350, 355. 
IOJd. at 1551,265 N.E.2dat353. 
11 Ibid. The defendants had relied on Nissenberg v. Felleman, n.6supra. 
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the oral evidence introduced to support defendants' contention of 
subsuretyship. Under Section 3-415(3), parol evidence is admissible 
to prove that a party has signed for accommodation (except as against 
a holder in due course). In the event that such evidence does affirma-
tively prove the party to be an accommodation indorser, under Section 
3-415(5) such accommodation party, if compelled to pay, is subrogated 
to the rights of the holder paid and can have his recourse on the instru-
ment. The comment to Section 3-415(5) notes that this provision is 
intended to change the result of the 1906 Massachusetts case of Quim-
by v. Varnum, 12 which held that an accommodation indorser who 
paid the instrument could not maintain an action on it against the 
accommodated party. Instead, Section 3-415(5) affirms the traditional 
common law principles of suretyship .. 
The Court's consideration of certain acts of SBA provided another 
opportunity for the application of code principles by analogy. The 
requirement of good faith under UCC §l-203 permeates the entire code 
and governs all commercial transactions. However, the Court in 
Snelling failed to mention the code standard of good faith when dis-
cussing the "wisdom and judgment" employed by SBA in its dealings 
with Mr. Snelling, his estate, and Plymouth. 
Whether the UCC applies to a particular commercial transaction de-
pends on the various specific exclusions of the code and also on a de-
termination of what principles of law and equity supplement, and are 
not displaced by the code. 13 A good illustration of the application of 
code principles by analogy can be found in United States v. First Na-
tional Bank of Boston. 14 Defendant bank had received payment from 
the United States on stolen domestic postal money orders which, al-
though they appeared to be proper, did bear forged initials of the 
issuing employee and unauthorized impressions of an issuing office 
stamp. In an action by the government against the bank to recover 
the amount paid, it was held that the defendant bank was under no 
duty of restitution where it had given value and had received payment 
without reason to know of either the forgery or the lack of authoriza-
tion. 
Speaking for the Federal District Court for the District of Massachu-
setts, Chief Judge Wyzanski first noted that since federal statutory law 
offered no real guidelines as to the issues, the case must be determined 
by judicially fashioned federal common law. He reasoned that since a 
postal money order has characteristics making it sufficiently like a 
negotiable instrument, UCC §3-418 should be applied by analogy. 
Section 3-418 provides in part that "acceptance of any [negotiable] in-
12 190 Mass. 211,76 N.E. 671 (1906). 
13 UCC §1-103 provides: "Unless displaced by the particular provision of this act, the 
principles of law and equity, including the law merchant and the law relative to capacity 
to contracl, principal and agent, estoppel, fraud, misrepresentation, duress, coercion, 
mistake, bankruptcy, or other validating or invalidating cause shall supplement its pro-
visions." 
14 263 F. Supp. 298(D. Mass. 1967). 
7
Craig: Chapter 5: Commercial Law
Published by Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School, 1971
72 1971 ANNUAL SURVEY OF MASSACHUSETTS LAW §5.3 
strument is final in favor of a holder in due course, or a person who has 
in good faith changed his position in reliance on the payment." Judge 
Wyzanski found that the policy underlying this section operated in 
favor of the defendant: if a bona fide purchaser of a postal money order 
does not get protection comparable to that of a holder in due course 
under the UCC, the effect would be to lessen the market for domestic 
postal money orders. 
§5.4. Rights and obligations of a depositary bank. Article 4 of the 
Uniform Commercial Code (Bank Deposits and Collections) provides 
a convenient classification of banks in the check collection process 
according to functions performed by each. 1 Thus, depositary bank 
means the first bank to which an item (check) is delivered for collection. 
Payor bank means a bank by which an item is payable as drawn or 
accepted (also called the drawee bank). A collecting bank means any 
bank handling the item for collection except the payor bank. An inter-
mediary bank is one in the collection process which is neither the de-
positary bank nor the payor bank. There are also categories of present-
ing bank and remitting bank whose functions are, respectively, to pre-
sent an item to a payor bank and to remit funds for an item. A bank 
may perform more than one function with respect to the same item. 
Thus, if an item is deposited with the same bank upon which it is 
drawn, the bank will be both the depositary bank and the payor bank. 
In Town Bank and Trust Co. v. Eaton,2 the plaintiff (Town Bank) 
was the depositary bank, and one of the defendants (First National 
Bank) was the payor bank. The case involved a fund resulting from 
checks issued by two life insurance companies and made payable to the 
same beneficiary. The beneficiary payee never received the checks, how-
ever, because her son-in-law forged her signature on the indorsement 
and deposited the checks in an account he shared with his wife at Town 
Bank. He previously had placed in the same account other funds be-
longing to his mother-in-law and wrongfully converted by him. When 
the forgery of the insurance checks was discovered, the conservator of 
the beneficiary payee claimed all funds remaining in the account. By 
that time Town Bank had collected the checks from First National 
Bank, which in turn had charged the amount of the checks against the 
respective accounts of its customers, the two insurance companies. 
Town Bank brought a bill in equity, interpleading the beneficiary pay-
ee, First National Bank, and the two insurance companies, and seeking 
to compel them to litigate among themselves the claims which each 
had to those funds held in the account at Town Bank. In the bill, Town 
Bank characterized itself as a "stakeholder" and alleged that it made no 
claim of interest in the funds. 
The case was referred to a master, whose findings illustrate the chain 
of responsibility which typically develops in check forgery cases. First 
of all, because the beneficiary payee had never received the insurance 
§5.4. I UCC§4-l05. 
2 1970Mass.Adv.Sh.1491,264N.E.2d686. 
8
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checks, the obligations of the two insurers to her had not yet been dis-
charged. The companies were required, therefore, to make payment 
to her. For its part, First National Bank could not properly charge its 
customers, the insurance companies, on items where the payee's signa-
ture had been forged. 3 This rule as to the payor bank under the UCC 
has limited exceptions,4 principally where a claiming party was itself 
substantially negligent, but these exceptions and the statute of limita-
tions prescribed in the code5 were not applicable in the present case. 
First National Bank was therefore liable to its customers to reinstate 
amounts improperly charged. At the end of the chain was Town Bank. 
As collecting bank it warranted to First National Bank, as payor bank, 
that it had good title to the items. 6 Since this warranty was breached 
because of the forgery, Town Bank was liable to First National Bank 
for the amount of the two items. 
None of the above findings by the master was contested on appeal to 
the Supreme Judicial Court. However, the master also had found that 
the balance of the account on deposit with Town Bank, then $3,757.45, 
was owed by Town Bank to the checks' payee on the ground that the 
money represented the balance of those other funds wrongfully con-
verted by the son-in-law even before the present action arose. Town 
Bank argued that the $3,757.45 in fact represented the balance of the 
checks issued by the insurance companies, and that it should not have 
to pay the money twice. Town Bank contended that under UCC §4-208 
it was entitled to set off the $3,757.45 as against its debt to First Nation-
al Bank.7 The Supreme Judicial Court correctly held that under UCC 
§4-208 security interests attach only against a customer to whom the 
bank has extended credit, not against the drawee bank. And in any 
event, no such security interest could displace the warranties made 
by Town Bank under UCC §4-207. Town Bank also contended that the 
master's report, if upheld, would unjustly enrich the checks' payee at 
its expense. As support, Town Bank cited its ledger sheets, which had 
been introduced at the hearing below.8 However, no mention was made 
3 UCC 3-404(1). See Stone and Webster Engr. Corp. v. First Nat!. Bank and Trust Co., 
345 Mass. I, 184 N.E.2d 358 (1962); Thompson Maple Products, Inc. v. Citizens Nat!. 
Bank, 211 Pa. Super. 42,234 A.2d 32 (1967). 
4 UCC §3-405 ("Impostors; Signature in Name of Payee") and §3-406 ("Negligence 
Contributing to Alteration or Unauthorized Signature"). As to §3-405, see generally 
First Pennsylvania Banking and Trust Co. v. Montgomery County Bank and Trust Co., 
29 Pa. D. & C.2d 596 (C. P. Montgomery Co. 1962). 
5 UCC§4-406(4). 
6 UCC§4-207. 
7 UCC §4-208( I) provides: 
"(I) A bank has a security interest in an item and any accompanying documents or the 
proceeds of either 
"(a) in case of an item deposited in an account to the extent to which credit given for 
the item has been withdrawn or applied; 
"(b) in case of an item for which it has given credit available for withdrawal as of 
right, to the extent of the credit given whether or not the credit is drawn upon and 
whether or not there is a right of charge-back; or 
"(c) if it makes an advance on or against the item." 
8 Brief for Plaintiff at 7. 
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of the ledger sheets in the opinion of the Supreme Judicial Court, and 
we do not even know if they were examined by the Court, which simply 
stated: "Where, as here, the evidence is not reported, the facts found by 
the master are conclusive unless they are mutually inconsistent or plain-
ly wrong."9 As a result, it is not clear what the $3,757.45 represented. 
The Court, however, rendered that issue immaterial by ruling that 
Town Bank, as a stakeholder, had disclaimed any right to the funds and, 
consequently, had no standing "to object to findings as to· the respec-
tive rights of the defendants or to its liability to pay the funds in its 
hands to the prevailing party." 10 Town Bank should have framed its 
bill in equity in such a way that its own claim of setoff would have 
been litigated along with all other claims to the funds it held. 
§5.5. Payment: Check as payment; Presentment; Certification. Gal-
linaro v. Fitzpatrick1 was an action by the purchaser of real -estate for 
specific performance of a purchase and sale agreement. In accordance 
with the agreement, the purchaser had given the vendors a check for 
$30,000 as a deposit, with instructions that they should "wait a day or 
so" before cashing it. Two days later, on a Wednesday, one of the ven-
dors sought to have the check certified at the bank where the purchaser 
was a depositor. The bank refused. He made the same request on Friday, 
and the bank again refused. This time an officer of the bank attached to 
the check a slip bearing the words, "uncollected funds." The principal 
issue in the case was whether the vendors were then justified in refusing 
to perform the purchase and sale agreement. 
Plaintiff's bill for specific performance was dismissed in superior 
court. On appeal, his principal argument was that the vendors were 
obligated to present the check properly in order to revive his own obli-
gation to have sufficient funds on deposit to cover the check. The Su-
preme Judicial Court agreed with this proposition, but held that the 
defendant vendors had properly presented the check on two separate 
occasions. The Court noted that certification of a check constitutes 
acceptance under UCC §3-411(1), and that under Section 3-504(1) 
"Presentment is a demand for acceptance or payment made upon the 
maker, acceptor, drawee or other payor by or on behalf of the holder." 
Thus, the Court reasoned, since presentment is a demand for accept-
ance, and since certification of a check is acceptance, demand for certi-
fication must be proper presentment. 
The Court did not say why presentment was necessary. It could have 
referred to Section 3-802(2). Where the check was accepted by the pro-
spective seller as a deposit against the purchase price, the obligation of 
the prospective buyer with respect to the deposit could be said to have 
been "suspended" until the check was presented. As the check was pre-
sented and dishonored, the prospective vendor could again look to the 
prospective buyer for the necessary deposit against the purchase price. 
It does not appear that any other deposit was tendered; therefore an 
essential element of the purchase and sale agreement was missing, and 
9 1970Mass.Adv.Sh.l491,1493-1494,264N.E.2d686,688. 
10 Id. at 1494-1495,264 N.E.2dat688-689. 
§5.5. 1 1971 Mass.Adv. Sh. !?93, 267 N.E.2d649. 
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specific performance m favor of the prospective buyer was rightfully 
denied. 
As to the manner of presentment, it is true that under Section 3-505 
"the party to whom presentment is made may without dishonor re-
quire" certain conditions, including exhibition of the instrument and 
"reasonable identification of the person making presentment and evi-
dence of his authority to make it if made for another." However, the 
drawee bank is not shown to have required presentment in any manner 
other than that actually employed. It is also true that a bank may have 
no obligation to certify a check under Section 3-411 (2), but in this case 
the bank refused certification because there were not collected funds, 
and it did not assert an unconditional right not to certify. Moreover, an 
item payable on demand should be presented for payment and not for 
acceptance. 2 However, if the holder presents an item for acceptance 
(certification in the case of a check),3 the drawer has no reason to com-
plain, for if the item had been certified the drawer would have been 
discharged. The result in this case appears to be consistent with the 
Uniform Commercial Code.4 
§5.6. Bankruptcy: Preference: Braunstein v. Massachusetts Bank 
and Trust Co. 1 The Federal Bankruptcy Act,2 Section 60, provides 
2 See UCC§3-501, Comment3. 
3 See UCC§3-411(1). 
4 Although the result of the case appears to be correct, the Court's reasoning seems 
incomplete. UCC §3-504 was relied on by the Court, but that provision must be read with 
Sections 3-501 and 3-511, which were not mentioned. Section 3-504(1) itself speaks of 
presentment as a demand for acceptance or payment; and under Section 3-50l(l)(c), in 
order to charge the drawer of a check (in this case the prospective purchaser), present-
ment for payment is necessary. If certification is acceptance under Section 3-411(1), then 
a demand for certification is a demand for acceptance, not payment, and the presentment 
would be improper. Failure to present properly does not discharge the drawer, however; 
his obligations are revived when proper presentment is made. 
Where, as in Gallinaro, the bank which refused to certify is the drawee bank, an argu-
ment can be made that presentment for acceptance amounts to presentment for payment. 
Section 3-410(1) defines acceptance as "the drawee's signed engagement to honor the 
draft as presented," and Section 1-201(21) provides that "[t]o 'honor' is to pay .... " 
Therefore, presentment to the drawee for certification, which is equivalent to a present-
ment for acceptance, may be considered a presentment to have the check honored/paid. 
It should be noted that even if the presentment in Gallinaro had been held improper 
by the court, the outcome of the case need not have been different. Under UCC §3-511 (3) 
(b), applicable to this case, the need for proper presentment is excused where payment or 
acceptance is refused and the refusal is not based on the lack of a proper presentment. 
When presentment is thus excused and the instrument is not duly accepted or paid, then 
under UCC §3-507(l)(b) the instrument is dishonored. Whether the rationale of the fore-
going steps could be telescoped into the first presentment made in Gallinaro is not clear. 
What is clear, however, is that the bank's first refusal because of uncollected funds was 
enough to excuse presentment under Section 3-511(3)(b) and render the second refusal a 
dishonor. The vendors were thereafter discharged on their obligation to perform accord-
ing to the purchase and sale agreement. 
The failure of the Supreme Judicial Court to apply all of the relevant code sections 
and discuss their interaction makes it difficult to forecast how presentment issues will be 
handled in future cases. Those who use the Uniform Commercial Code should be careful 
in tracing the sections which apply to a particular presentment problem.-Ens. 
§5.6. 1 433F.2d 1281 (lstCir.l971). 
211 U.S.C.§§I-1255. 
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a remedy to trustees in bankruptcy of insolvent debtors against any 
creditor who has received a voidable preference. A voidable preference 
is created by (i) a transfer, (ii) of any of the property of a debtor, (iii) to 
or for the benefit of a creditor, (iv) for or on account of an antecedent 
debt, (v) made or suffered by such debtor while insolvent, (vi) within 
four months before the filing by or against him of the petition initiating 
a proceeding under the Bankruptcy Act, (vii) where the effect of the 
transfer will be to enable such creditor to obtain a greater percentage 
of his debt than some other creditor of the same class.3 A preference 
may be avoided by the trustee if the creditor receiving the transfer had, 
at the time when the transfer was made, "reasonable cause to believe 
that the debtor [was] insolvent." Where the preference is voidable, the 
trustee may recover the property or its value where it has been convert-
ed. In the case of conversion, the trustee may recover the value of the 
property from the preferred creditor who disposed of the property or 
from that creditor's transferee if the latter is not a bona fide purchaser 
or lienor for "a present fair and equivalent value." 
The trustee may enforce his claim for voidable preference in a plenary 
action in an appropriate federal or state court. The federal courts have 
jurisdiction without necessity for diversity of citizenship. If the creditor 
has filed a proof of claim in the bankruptcy proceeding, a summary 
proceeding in the referee's court is available to the trustee.4 In either 
type of proceeding, the trustee has the burden of proof on all the ele-
ments enumerated in Section 60(a), as well as the additional burden im-
posed on the trustee in Section 60(b) to prove that the creditor had 
reasonable cause to believe that the debtor was insolvent at the time of 
transfer. Receiving a preference is not an unlawful act and, of course, 
many transfers are not challenged by reason of the simple fact that no 
bankruptcy petition has been filed within four months thereof. 
Section 67 of the Bankruptcy Act, relating to liens and fraudulent 
transfers, is a cognate section to be considered with Section 60 in various 
circumstances. Section 67(d)(2) incorporates into federal bankruptcy 
law the substance of Sections 4 to 7 of the Uniform Fraudulent Convey-
ance Act.5 A transfer within the terms of Section 67(d)(2) of the Bank-
ruptcy Act can be avoided by a trustee if the transfer was made within 
one year of the bankruptcy petition. Thus, although a transfer might 
not be challenged under Section 60 because four months have elapsed, 
it might be challenged by a trustee if the necessary elements of a fraudu-
lent transfer are present. Section 67(d)(3) is of consequence in some cir-
cumstances. Under that section a transfer, even for present considera-
tion, may be challenged within four months if made in contemplation 
of a bankruptcy petition or of liquidation, if the new consideration is 
intended to be used to prefer particular creditors and if the transferee 
"knew or believed that the debtor intended to make such use of such 
consideration." This section is apparently designed to discourage pre£-
! Id. §60(a). 
4 For a discussion of the referee's summary jurisdiction, see Katchen v. Landy, 336 F.2d 
535 (lOth Cir. 1964), aff'd, 382 U.S. 323 (1966). 
5 G.L., c. 190A. 
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erential payments to troublesome creditors in order to postpone the 
filing of a bankruptcy petition against an insolvent debtor. For example, 
a large creditor who has received a preference may be tempted to pro-
vide funds to make relatively small payments to troublesome creditors 
in the hope that bankruptcy might be postponed until his own posi-
tion is protected by the lapse of four months from the transfer to him. 
Of course, preferential transfers can be of money or any other kind of 
property and can be received either as payment or as security for an ante-
cedent debt. Although the receipt of a preferential transfer can hardly 
be detrimental, and might benefit a creditor, it might be prudent, if 
circumstances permit, for a creditor who has received property other 
than money to wait the four months before disposing of the property. 
The reason for the delay is that he can more easily give up the property 
if the transfer is challenged by a subsequent trustee than risk a deter-
mination of value on disposition. The creditor's obligation is measured 
by value and not by what he may have received in the disposition of 
the property. A jury verdict on value might come as an unpleasant sur-
pnse. 
The Braunstein case provides an illustration of some of the points 
mentioned above and serves as an important guide to future litigants 
in bankruptcy preference claims. The case arose in a plenary action 
brought by a trustee in bankruptcy against a bank which had received 
a security interest in substantially all of the assets of its customer as 
security for an antecedent debt. After a jury trial there was judgment for 
the trustee, which was affirmed by the First Circuit Court of Appeals. 
One of the central issues was whether the bankrupt was insolvent at 
the time of the transfer. It is perhaps curious that the defendant bank 
conceded that there was evidence from which the jury could conclude 
that the bank had reason to believe the debtor was insolvent at the time 
of the transfer, but the bank argued that there was no evidence on which 
the jury could find that the debtor was in fact then insolvent. The bank's 
seemingly curious position reflects the fact that the trustee has the bur-
den of proving both "reason to believe" and the fact of insolvency. A 
creditor might believe that his debtor is insolvent, but the fact of in-
solvency must still be proved. The controverted evidence on insolvency 
involved the weight to be given to schedules filed in the bankruptcy 
proceeding after the transfer, and the weight to be given an accountant's 
report made some time prior to the transfer. 
Under Section 7(a)(8) of the Bankruptcy Act, a bankrupt must pre-
pare, make oath to, and file in court a list of his creditors and "a sched-
ule of his property, showing the amount and kind of property, the loca-
tion thereof and its money value, in detail." Such a schedule and such 
a list would ordinarily show an c:xcess of liabilities over assets, i.e., an 
insolvency in a bankruptcy sense. The First Circuit Court of Appeals 
has said that if there is evidence that the bankrupt's financial condition 
changed but little between the transfer date and the date of the petition 
in bankruptcy, "the schedule could be retrojected."6 And in Braunstein 
6 Hassan v. Middlesex County Natl. Bank, 333 F.2d 838,840 (1st Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 
379 u.s. 932 (1964). 
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the court of appeals stated that the schedule "may not have been dis-
positive but they were certainly probative evidence [for the jury to con-
sider in determining which debts were in existence on the transfer 
date]."7 Apparently, the debts listed in the schedule must be shown to 
be valid debts once the defendant raises the question by timely objec-
tion. Because the schedules may be particularly useful to the trustee in 
an action on a preference claim, the defendant must try to influence and 
restrict the use of the schedules at trial. 
An uncertified auditor's report of assets and liabilities of the debtor 
about five months before the transfer was admitted in Braunstein on the 
question of insolvency. The books and accounts of the debtor were not 
available at the trial, even after "diligent search," and the auditor's 
report was admitted "as the best available evidence." The trial judge 
charged that it was for the jury to decide whether the figures in the re-
port were accurate and whether those accurately reflected the status of 
the business.8 Evidence was also introduced to show the progress or 
lack of progress of the business in the time between audit and transfer. 
The court of appeals did not refer to the Uniform Commercial Code 
in the present case, but of course the code has great relevance to bank-
ruptcy preference problems. A security interest must be perfected to be 
good against a trustee in bankruptcy. Whether a security interest is 
perfected depends on local law, which commonly means the UCC, al-
though with certain kinds of collateral other statutes, state or federal, 
may control. Section 60 of the Bankruptcy Act has much to say as to 
time of perfecting. The subject is too large to discuss here, but a few 
general statements may be useful. Perfection is ordinarily accomplished 
either through possession or by filing and recording. Sometimes there 
is a choice, but with receivables and certain other kinds of collateral 
there must be a filing, and with instruments and securities there must 
be possession. Timing is important. A creditor must take his security 
before or at the same time as making his advance. If the advance is made 
first, the subsequent security is for an antecedent debt. One practical 
allowance is made in Section 60(a)(7) of the Bankruptcy Act. If a securi-
ty agreement and filing instrument are received at the same time the 
advance is made, Section 60(a)(7) allows a specified time within which 
to file. This avoids the inconvenience or impossibility of closing every 
secured transaction at the filing office. 
Each element in the capital Bankruptcy Act's definition of a voidable 
preference raises its own problems. For example, what is a transfer? If 
a loan is made against all present and future receivables of a debtor and 
new receivables are created from day to day, is each receivable trans-
ferred when created, or are the new receivables simply incorporated 
within the earlier blanket security agreement? It is not uncommon for 
a retail merchant to consent to a lien in his inventory pursuant to UCC 
§9-204, in order to secure a loan made to him. A problem may arise, 
7 443 F.2d 1281, 1284(lstCir.1971). 
8 Ibid. 
14
Annual Survey of Massachusetts Law, Vol. 1971 [1971], Art. 8
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/asml/vol1971/iss1/8
§5.7 COMMERCIAL LAW 79 
however, if this merchant later becomes insolvent. Although the secur-
ity agreement may have been entered into well in advance of the four 
months preceding bankruptcy, it is quite possible that the debtor's 
inventory will have "turned over" completely within the four-month 
period. An argument can be made that the entire "floating lien" is void-
able under Section 60 of the Bankruptcy Act, as it may be viewed as a 
transfer of collateral for antecedent debt.9 
§5.7. Subrogation: Canter v. Schlager. 1 This was an action 
for money owed under a written construction contract. Plaintiff was 
the trustee in bankruptcy of a general contractor, and defendant was 
the owner of the premises on which a building had been constructed 
by the contractor. While construction was still in progress, an invol-
untary petition in bankruptcy was filed against the contractor, but 
work on the building was completed under the supervision of a re-
ceiver. There was the usual surety company payment and performance 
bond, under which the surety undertook to complete the project and 
to pay subcontractors. The surety paid more than $60,000 to subcon-
tractors who had furnished labor and materials for the building, and 
the owner paid the surety $36,630. I I, which was all that remained due 
under the construction contract. Since the issue in Canter was the 
propriety of making this payment to the surety rather than to the trust-
ee in bankruptcy, the surety was the actual party in interest in this 
litigation. 
9 A thorough discussion of the complex issue of whether a floating lien constitutes a 
voidable preference is beyond the scope of this chapter. Briefly, the trustee in bankruptcy 
will generally argue as follows: In the "floating lien" situation, where all the necessary 
steps such as filing are taken before the security interest attaches, the lien is perfected 
under UCC §9-303(1) at the time when it attaches. However, under UCC §9-204(1), a 
security interest cannot attach until the debtor has rights in the collateral. Therefore, if 
accounts receivable or items of inventory come into the debtor's possession within four 
months of the petition in bankruptcy, the "floating lien" is not perfected until within the 
four-month period and is consequently a voidable transfer within the definition of Sec-
tion 60(a)(2) of the Federal Bankruptcy Act. 
Several cases, however, have rejected this reasoning. In Rosenberg v. Rudnick, 262 F. 
Supp. 635 (D. Mass. 1967), involving inventory acquired under a security agreement 
covering present and future inventory, the federal district court found against the trustee. 
According to the court, the test of when a transfer takes place is not governed by the time 
when state law (the UCC) may determine that a security interest has been perfected. Rather, 
the test is governed by state law as to the time when the security interest becomes one 
which cannot be defeated by a subsequent lien obtainable in proceedings on a simple 
contract action. On the basis of this reasoning, a security interest in inventory will not 
constitute a voidable preference if perfected outside the four-month period. Rather, the 
requirements for transfer under Section 60(a)(2) will be deemed to have been met on the 
date of the execution of the security agreement. 
For cases citing Rosenberg with approval, see Grain Merchants of Indiana v. Union 
Bank and Savings Co., 408 F.2d 209, 213, 216 (7th Cir. 1969); In re Grain Merchants of 
Indiana, Inc., 286 F. Supp. 597, 605 (N.D. Ind. 1968); In re Portland Newspaper Publish-
ing Co., 271 F. Supp. 395, 399-400 (D. Ore. 1967). For a recent article criticizing the re-
sult and the reasoning of cases such as Rosenberg, see Countryman, Code Security In-
terests in Bankruptcy, 75 Com. L.J. 270-280 (Sept. 1970). 
§5.7. 1 1971 Mass. Adv. Sh. 279,267 N.E.2d 492. 
15
Craig: Chapter 5: Commercial Law
Published by Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School, 1971
80 1971 ANNUAL SURVEY OF MASSACHUSETTS LAW §5.7 
The right to payment under a contract, even where the right is not 
yet earned, is a "contract right" under UCC §9-106.2 An assignee of a 
contract right, as secured party, must file a financing statement to per-
fect his security interest against a trustee in bankruptcy, unless the 
assignee falls within the exceptions noted in Sections 9-104(f) and 
9-302(1)(e). 3 In its application for payment and performance bonds, 
the contractor in Canter assigned to the surety its right to payment 
under the contract. However, no financing statement was ever filed 
with respect to the assignment. The principal argument of the surety 
was that it was not a secured party under the Uniform Commercial 
Code and was not required, therefore, to file. The surety claimed by 
reason of subrogation, an equitable doctrine not affected by the code. 
A surety had previously prevailed, on this ground, against a Massa-
chusetts assignee bank which claimed a security interest in a contract 
right. 4 In the present case, the Supreme Judicial Court reached the 
same result in favor of the surety as against a trustee in bankruptcy of 
the contractor. 
Subrogation is a broad principle of equity jurisdiction and is aptly 
illustrated in French Lumber Co. v. Commercial Realty and Finance 
Co.5 That case involved three successive ~ecurity interests in a Cadillac 
automobile, each securing obligations to the respective secured parties 
(Ware, Commercial, and Associates). Associates, third in line, paid the 
debtor's obligation to Ware, which was first in line, and received an 
acknowledgment of payment in full from Ware. Ware might have 
assigned its first security interest to Associates under UCC §9-302(2), 
but for some reason did not do so. Nevertheless, the Supreme Judicial 
Court held that Associates was subrogated to the rights of Ware by 
reason of the payment of the debt and, therefore, came ahead of Com-
mercial with respect to proceeds from the sale of the Cadillac. The 
Court in French looked to precode decisions which reached the same 
result through the principle of subrogation. 
The decisions on subrogation discussed above are not superseded 
by the Uniform Commercial Code. Section 1-103 of the Code pro-
2 UCC §9-106, Comment I, explains: "It has been found advisable to distinguish 
rights earned from rights not yet earned for several reasons. The recognition of the 'con-
tract right' as collateral in a security transaction makes clear that this Article rejects any 
lingering common law notion that only rights already earned can be assigned." 
3 UCC §9-104(f) provides that Article 9 of the code does not apply "to a sale of accounts, 
contract rights or chattel paper as part of a sale of the business out of which they arose, 
or an assignment of accounts, contract rights or chattel paper which is for the purpose 
of collection only, or a transfer of a contract right to an assignee who is also to do the 
performance under the contract." 
UCC §9-302(l)(e) provides that a financing statement must be filed to perfect all se-
curity interests except "an assignment of accounts or contract rights which does not 
alone or in conjunction with other assignments to the same assignee transfer a significant 
part of the outstanding accounts or contract rights of the assignor." 
4 Framingham Trust Co. v. Gould-Nat!. Batteries, Inc., 427 F.2d 856 (1st Cir. 1970); 
National Shawmut Bank v. New Amsterdam Cas. Co., 411 F.2d 843 (1st Cir. 1969). For 
a discussion of the former case, see 1970 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §7.8. 
5 346 Mass. 716, 195 N.E.2d507 (1964). 
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vides in part, "Unless displaced by the particular provisions of 
this chapter, the principles of law and equity ... shall supple-
ment its provisions." No provision of the Code purports to affect 
the fundamental equitable doctrine of subrogation. 6 
81 
The Court in Canter v. Schlager repeated the rationale of French and 
also quoted7 from a 1965 Pennsylvania decision: 
Of basic importance is the general rule of Section 9-102(2) that 
Article 9 "applies to security interests created by contract" (Em-
phasis supplied.) Rights of subrogation, although growing out 
of a contractual setting and oftimes articulated by the contract, 
do not depend for their existence on a grant in the contract, but 
are created by law to avoid injusti-ce. Therefore, subrogation 
rights are not "security interests" within the meaning of Article 
9.8 
Thus it must be deemed established in Massachusetts that claims to 
funds or property by right of subrogation are not security interests 
within the meaning of Article 9. One must look to equity jurisprudence 
to determine what are subrogation rights, and these rights will be en-
forced without regard to perfection under the code. 
The Canter decision bolsters recent Massachusetts authority allowing 
a surety in the construction contract situation to obtain priority under 
a subrogation theory.9 
Subrogation is referred to in UCC §9-504(5 ), which provides: 
A person who is liable to a secured party under a guaranty, in-
dorsement, repurchase agreement or the like and who receives a 
transfer of the collateral from the secured party or is subrogated 
to his rights has thereafter the rights and duties of the secured 
party. Such a transfer of collateral is not a sale or disposition of 
the collateral under this Article. 
It would seem to follow from this language that a person realizing on 
collateral by right of subrogation must, as regards the debtor, proceed 
according to the security agreement of the secured party in whose right 
he acts. This would appear to mean that he must follow the terms of 
the security agreement as to notice, and the terms of other requirements 
as to the realization on collateral. It would also appear to mean that 
the rights of a gurantor in the collateral, as against a trustee in bank-
ruptcy of the principal debtor, depend on whether the creditor has 
perfected his security interest The Supreme Judicial Court refused to 
establish a general requirement that sureties engaged in construction 
projects perfect security interests in their assignments by filing. In-
stead, the Court noted that the draftsmen of the Uniform Commercial 
Code had considered the problems of such sureties and had decided, 
6 Id. at 719, 195 N.E.2d at 510. 
7 1971 Mass.Adv.Sh.279,281,267N.E.2d492,494. 
8 Jacobs v. Northeastern Corp., 416 Pa. 417,429,206 A.2d 49,55 (1965). 
9 See cases cited in n. 4 supra. 
17
Craig: Chapter 5: Commercial Law
Published by Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School, 1971
82 1971 ANNUAL SURVEY OF MASSACHUSETTS LAW §5.7 
presumably, not to include a requirement that rights of subrogation 
be filed. The result in the present case is in keeping with the common 
law priority long given to those who claim by right of subrogation. 10 
Creditors must be aware of the widespread use of sureties in connection 
with building projects, and they must look to subordination agree-
ments for any protection they feel is necessary against the surety's 
priority. 
§5.8. Legislation: Privity of contract. Chapter 106, Section 2-318, 
of the General Laws has been amended by the Massachusetts legislature 
so as to eliminate, for most purposes, the defense of lack of privity in 
actions for breach of warranty. 1 This important statutory change has 
been a long time in coming, and practitioners should be aware of its 
possible consequences. A thorough discussion of the amendment and 
its potential effects may be found in §§13.3 and 13.18 infra. 
STUDENT CoMMENT 
§5.9. Sufficiency of financing statements: Description of colla-
teral: Still Associates, Inc. v. Murphy.! On October 31, 1967, Charles 
J. Lavoie and his wife executed a promissory note, a chattel mortgage, 
a financing statement, and a security agreement in favor of plaintiff. 
The financing statement described, among other items of collateral, 
"one (l) 1967 Dodge, 6 cyl. D-100 pickup, serial #1161-702080." Plain-
tiff's agent, however, had made a one-digit error in preparing the docu-
ments for Lavoie's signature: the true serial number was 1161-702088. 
On September 30, 1968, Lavoie sold the truck to the defendant with the 
serial number correctly identified on the bill of sale. At that time La-
voie was in default on his payments to plaintiff. Defendant had no 
knowledge of plaintiff's lien and purchased the truck in good faith, 
but without any search for recorded security interests. He took posses-
sion of the truck and refused a subsequent demand by the plaintiff that 
it be returned to Lavoie. 
Plaintiff then brought an action in the Boston Municipal Court for 
conversion by defendant of the 1967 Dodge truck. Defendant answered 
by way of general denial, and the trial judge found in his favor. The 
appellate division of the Boston Municipal Court affirmed, whereupon 
plaintiff appealed to the Supreme Judicial Court, assigning as error 
the invalidation of his financing statement because of a one-digit error 
in the serial number. The Supreme Judicial Court reversed and held 
that "one (l) Dodge, 6 cyl. D-100 pickup" was sufficient description 
even without the serial number, and that the one-digit error was not so 
misleading as to invalidate the financing statement without proof of 
actual prejudice. The court relied on the notice-filing theory of UCC 
10 See generally 1971 Mass. Adv. Sh. 279,283 n.l, 267 N.E.2d 492,495 n.l. 
§5.8. 1 Actsof1971,c.670. 
§5.9. 1 1971 Mass. Adv. Sh. 245,267 N.E.2d217. 
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§9-4022 and overruled Wise v. Kennedy, 3 the case on which the appel-
late division had based its decision. 
This comment will be concerned with the sufficiency of financing 
statements under the Uniform Commercial Code, with particular atten-
tion to problems in description of collateral and to the notice-filing 
theory of the code, which is the essence of the decision in Still Asso-
ciates. The general standards which have emerged in the decisions of 
other jurisdictions will also be reviewed. It will be argued that Wise v. 
Kennedy should have been distinguished on its facts rather than over-
ruled, and that its reasoning may still retain some validity. 
To perfect a security interest in personal property, fixtures, accounts, 
or contract rights within the scope of Article 9 of the U CC, 4 the parties 
must execute a security agreement and file a financing statement pursu-
ant to UCC §§9-203 and 9-402, respectively. A security agreement is 
proper only if it is signed by the debtor and contains a description of 
collateral, or in certain cases a description of the land from which colla-
teral will originate.5 These formal requirements are in the nature of a 
statute of frauds for secured transactions. Their purpose is evidentiary: 
to reduce "the possibility of future dispute as to the terms of a security 
agreement and as to what property stands as collateral for the obliga-
tion secured."6 The financing statement, on the other hand, must con-
tain the signatures of both the debtor and the secured party, together 
2 The UCC was enacted as Chapter I 06 of the Massachusetts General Laws. Because 
corresponding section numbers are identical, all references, unless otherwise indicated, 
are to the 1962 Official Text of the Uniform Commercial Code. 
3 248 Mass. 83, 142 N.E. 755 (1924). 
4 The scope of Article9 is set forth in UCC §9-102, which provides: 
"(!) Except as otherwise provided in Section 9-103 on multiple state transactions and 
in section 9-104 on excluded transactions, this Article applies so far as concerns any per-
sonal property and fixtures within the jurisdiction of this state 
"(a) to any transaction (regardless of its form) which is intended to create a security 
interest in personal property or fixtures including goods, documents, instruments, gen-
eral intagibles, chattel paper, accounts or contract rights; and also 
"(b) to any sale of accounts, contract rights or chattel paper. 
"(2) This Article applies to security interests created by contract including pledge, 
assignment, chattel mortgage, chattel trust, trust deed, factor's lien, equipment trust, 
conditional sale, trust receipt, other lien or title retention contract and lease or consign-
ment intended as security. This Article does not apply to statutory liens except as pro-
vided in section 9-310. 
"(3) The application of this Article to a security interest in a secured obligation is 
not affected by the fact that the obligation is itself secured by a transaction or interest to 
which this Article does not apply." 
5 UCC§9-203 provides: 
"(!) Subject to the provisions of section 4-208 on the security interest of a collecting 
bank and section 9-113 on a security interest arising under the Article on Sales, a security 
interest is not enforceable against the debtor or third parties unless 
"(a) the collateral is in the possession of the secured party; or 
"(b) the debtor has signed a security agreement which contains a description of the 
collateral and in addition when the security interest covers crops or oil, gas or minerals 
to be extracted or timber to be cut, a description of the land concerned. In describing colla-
teral, the world 'proceeds' is sufficient without further description to cover proceeds of 
any character." 
6 UCC §9-203, Comment 3. Comment 5 to the same section further explains: "The for-
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with their addresses and a statement "indicating the types or describing 
the items of collateral. "7 In Massachusetts the statement must then be 
filed with the secretary of state and the clerk of the town where the 
debtor's residence or place of business is located.8 Certain informa-
tion from the filed statement is thereafter available "upon the request 
of any person. "9 
This is the essence of notice-filing. Its purpose is to alert interested 
parties to the fact that certain types of property may be subject to se-
curity interests. Further inquiry directed to the signed parties them-
selves is usually required if an interested party is to learn the precise 
nature of the interests and the identity of the property involved. 10 Un-
like the security agreement, the financing statement need not indicate 
the kind of security interest, and a specific description of the collateral 
is optional. Yet the description of collateral must meet the standard of 
UCC §9-110: "For the purposes of this article, any description of per-
mal requisites stated in this Section are not only conditions to the enforceability of a 
security interest against third parties. They are in the nature of a Statute of Frauds. Un-
less the secured party is in possession of the collateral, his security interest, absent a 
writing which satisfies subsection (l)(b), is not enforceable even against the debtor and 
cannot be made so on any theory of equitable mortgage or the like .... More harm than 
good would result from allowing creditors to establish a secured status by parol evidence 
after they have neglected the simple formality of obtaining a signed writing." 
7 UCC §9-402(1) provides: "A financing statement is sufficient if it is signed by the 
debtor and the secured party, gives an address of the secured party from which informa-
tion concerning the security interest may be obtained, gives a mailing address of the debt-
or and contains a statement indicating the types, or describing the items, of collateral. 
A financing statement may be filed before a security agreement is made or a security in-
terest otherwise attaches. When the financing statement covers crops growing or to be 
grown or goods which are or are to become fixtures, the statement must also contain a 
general description of the real estate concerned and the name of the record owner there-
of. A copy of the security agreement is sufficient as a financing statement if it contains 
the above information and is signed by both parties." 
8 G.L., c. 106, §9-403(1) provides: "Presentation for filing of a financing statement 
and tender of the filing fee or acceptance of the statement by the filing officer or register 
of deeds constitutes filing under this Article. As used in this Part, 'filing officer' means 
a filing officer other than a register of deeds." Massachusetts has localized the code pro-
visions which govern filing. See G.L., c. 106, §9-401(1). 
9 G.L., c. 106, §9-407(2) provides: "Upon request of any person, the filing officer, ex-
cept the registers of deeds and assistant recorders of the land court, shall issue his certi-
ficate showing whether there is on file on the date and hour stated therein, any presently 
effective financing statement naming a particular debtor and any statement of assign-
ment thereof and if there is, giving the date and hour of filing of each such statement and 
the names and addresses of each secured party named therein. The fee for such a certifi-
cate shall be three dollars. Upon request the filing officer shall furnish a copy of any 
filed financing statement, continuation statement, termination statement, statement of 
assignment or statement of release .... " 
10 UCC §9-402, Comment 2 explains: "This Section adopts the system of 'notice filing' 
which has proved successful under the Uniform Trust Receipts Act. What is required to 
be filed is not, as under chattel mortgage and conditional sales acts, the security agree-
ment itself, but only a simple notice which may be filed before the security interest 
attaches or thereafter. The notice itself indicates merely that the secured party who has 
filed may have a security interest in the collateral described. Further inquiry from the 
parties concerned will be necessary to disclose the complete state of affairs." 
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sonal property or real estate is sufficient whether or not it is specific 
if it reasonably identifies what is described." This section would appear 
to establish a single standard of sufficiency of description for the docu-
ments involved in a secured transaction, but in reality it does not. The 
descriptions of collateral in the security agreement and the financing 
statement serve distinctly different purposes: the former description 
serves as proof of the existence and scope of a security interest, while 
the latter is intended simply to alert interested persons to make further 
inquiry.u As a result, separate standards have evolved for determining 
the sufficiency of a description of collateral. 
The difference in standards is illustrated by In re Taylored Products, 
lnc.,IZ wherein the debtor had executed a financing statement and 
security agreement prior to bankruptcy. Both documents described 
collateral as "accounts and notes receivable and inventories of raw ma-
terials, work in process and finished goods wherever located." Neither 
document specifically referred to after-acquired property. Petitioner, 
the secured creditor, requested authority to foreclose against certain 
after-acquired property in debtor's inventory. The property, however, 
had been included in the estate in bankruptcy, and the trustee ob-
jected to the foreclosure on the ground that after-acquired property 
had not been specifically mentioned in either financing document. The 
referee concluded that while an after-acquired property clause is not 
necessary in a financing statement, it must be included in the security 
agreement if an enforceable interest is to attach in property thereafter 
acquired. 13 He reasoned that the UCC required the entire transaction 
to be embodied in the security agreement, but not in the financing 
statement. In further support of his position, the referee could have 
pointed to the difference under the code between a security agreement, 
which must describe the collateral, and a financing statement, which is 
sufficient even if it merely indicates the type of collateral. It is possible, 
for example, to indicate the type of collateral without distinguishing it 
from other property of the same type. 
The Review Committee Proposals for changes in Article 914 recog-
nized the different standards which have developed for security agree-
ments and financing statements, and the committee recommended, 
therefore, that UCC §9-110 be amended to read: "Except as provided 
in Section 9-402 on formal requirements of a financing statement, any 
11 "The collateral description in the financing statement, under section 9-402, need be 
only of the 'types' of property secured. The distinction between this and the security agree-
ment 'description of the collateral' is not completely clear. Nor is there much help in the 
Comment to section 9-203, to the effect that the security agreement contain 'a description 
of the collateral or kinds of collateral.' " Kripke and Felsenfeld, Secured Transactions, 
A Practical Approach to Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 17 Rutgers L. Rev. 
168, 172 (1962). 
12 Bankruptcy No. 29,914N (W.D. Mich., Apr.!!, 1968),5 UCCRep. Serv.286. 
13 The referee based his opinion in part upon the fact that UCC §9-204(3) and (4) refer 
specifically to after-acquired property clauses. 
14 For the complete text of the committee proposals, see Permanent Editorial Board 
for the UCC, Review Committee for Article 9 of the UCC, Preliminary Draft I (Dec. 1968). 
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description of personal property or real estate is sufficient . if it 
reasonably identifies what is described." 15 (Committee's emphasis.) 
This addition would have given fair notice of the double standard 
which has emerged in judicial decisions under Article 9, but the pro-
posal was not adopted in the committee's final report. 16 
In Still Associates the Supreme Judicial Court confirmed that the 
purpose of the financing statement is to give notice that certain colla-
teral may already be subject to a security interest. The Court relied on 
National Cash ~egister Co. v. Firestone and Co.,I1 a 1963 Massachu-
setts case which has become the leading decision on notice-filing. In 
National Cash Register, defendant creditor claimed title to a cash 
register under its financing statement, which was on file at the time 
the debtor acquired the cash register from plaintiff. Plaintiff had sold 
and delivered the cash register to debtor on a conditional sales agree-
ment. If plaintiff, although a subsequent creditor, had filed its financing 
statement within ten days of delivery of the cash register, it would have 
had priority in the item over the defendant's earlier lien. 18 Plaintiff, 
however, waited almost a month before perfecting its security interest. 
Having failed to act in time, the plaintiff based its claim to the cash 
register on an action for conversion, challenging the sufficiency of 
defendant's financing statement and security agreement on the ground 
that the description of collateral in those documents would not em-
brace the cash register. The financing statement described as collateral: 
All c:ontents of luncheonette including equipment such as: 
booths and tables; stand and counter; tables; chairs; booths; 
steam tables; salad unit; potato peeler; U.S. slicer; range; case; 
fryer; compressor; bobtail; milk dispenser; silex; 100 Class air 
conditioner; signs; pastry case; mixer; dishes; silverware; tables; 
hot fudge; Haven Ex; 2 door station wagon 1957 FordA57Rl07215. 
The security agreement contained an identical description, but with 
the additional clause, "together with all property and articles now, 
and which may hereafter be, used or mixed with, added or attached to, 
and/or substituted for, any of the foregoing described property." In 
both documents the debtor's business was incorrectly identified as 
"Cozy Kitchen" instead of "Kozy Kitchen," and the financing state-
ment did not specifically mention after-acquired property. 
15 Proposed changes or additions are indicated by underlining in the preliminary 
draft. 
16 The committee explained in the forward to its final report that only those amend-
ments which were designed to remedy "unworkable provisions" were adopted. Review 
Committee for Article 9 of the UCC, Final Report (Apr. 1971). 
17 346 Mass. 255, 191 N.E.2d 471 (1963). The rationale of the decision has been adopted 
in numerous cases. See, e. g., Dubay v. Williams, 417 F.2d 1277, 1284 (9th Cir. 1969); 
Thompson v. United States, 408 F.2d 1075, 1084 (8th eir. 1969); In re Thomas, 310 F. 
Supp. 338, 340 (N.D. Cal. 1970). 
18 vee §9-312(4) provides: "A purchase money security interest in collateral other 
than inventory has priority over a conflicting security interest in the same collateral if 
the purchase money security interest is perfected at the time the debtor receives possession 
of the collateral or within ten days thereafter." 
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Plaintiff prevailed in the Boston Muncipal Court, and the appellate 
division affirmed. The Supreme Judicial Court, however, reversed and 
held that the description of collateral in the security agreement was 
sufficient to identify all of the contents of the luncheonette under UCC 
§§9-110 and 9-402. The error in listing the name of the business was 
held not to be seriously misleading because the financing statement 
had not been filed under the business name, but rather had been cor-
rectly filed in debtor's name, "Carroll, Edmund d/b/a Cozy Kitchen." 
The Court found the financing statement sufficient to give the required 
notice, even without the after-acquired property clause. 
The framers of the Uniform Commercial Code, by adopting the 
"notice filing" system, had the purpose to recommend a method 
of protecting security interests which, at the same time, would 
give subsequent potential creditors and other interested persons 
information and procedures adequate to enable the ascertainment 
of the facts they needed to know.l9 
In Still Associates, the Supreme Judicial Court relied on the above 
theory of notice-filing and concluded: "Section 9-402(1) requires only 
a 'statement indicating the types or describing the items, of collateral,' 
and the concededly accurate description, 'one (1) 1967 Dodge 6 cyl. 
D-100 pickup' fully satisfied this requirement."2° The Court then 
considered the effect of the serial number error on this otherwise suffi-
cient description, and determined, without further explanation, that 
the one-digit mistake "is not on its face sufficiently serious to invali-
date the financing statement. "21 In so holding, the Court apparently 
relied on UCC §9-402(5 ): "A financing statement substantially comply-
ing with the requirements of this seCtion is effective even though it 
contains minor errors which are not seriously misleading." (Emphasis 
added.) 
The comment to UCC §9-402(5) announces that the aim of this pro-
vision is to "discourage the fanatical and impossibly refined reading of 
such [filing statutes]." As an example of this rejected approach, the com-
ment cites the Massachusetts decisi.on in General Motors Acceptance 
Corp. v. Haley, 22 where plaintiff claimed a security interest in cer-
tain equipment and in the proceeds of certain goods under trust receipt 
transactions with the "E. R. Millen Co., Inc." The statement of trust 
receipt financing incorrectly identified debtor as "E. R. Millen Com-
pany,'' the name under which debtor had done business prior to in-
corporation. Millen subsequently assigned all of its assets to defendant 
for the benefit of creditors, and plaintiff sued for a declaratory decree 
as to its rights in the collateral. The trial court ruled that the plaintiff 
had no rights in the collateral, holding the plaintiff's filed statement 
was invalid because of the error. The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed, 
19 346Mass. 255,261, 191 N.E.2d471, 474 (1963). 
2o 1970 Mass. Adv. Sh. 245,246,267 N.E.2d217, 218. 
21 Id.at247,267N.E.2dat218. 
22 329 Mass. 559, 109 N.E.2d 143 (1952). 
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holding that there must be exact compliance with the statute for con-
structive notice to be valid: 
It is urged . . . that the statute merely requires that the trust-
ee be so designated that a creditor or other interested person would 
not be misled as to the identity of the trustee; and here it is said, 
no one could be deceived because of the resemblance of the name, 
the identity of address, and the description of the goods acquired 
by the trustee .... [W]e are nevertheless of the opinion that the 
designation was not in compliance with the [Uniform Trust Re-
ceipts) [A )ct. 23 
In rejecting the Haley approach, UCC §9-402(5) sets forth a new test 
to determine the effect of error in a financing statement. The question 
now asked is whether the prudent title searcher would have been mis-
led. If the court so finds, then the error is deemed to be "seriously mis-
leading" and the financing statement is invalid. The new test can 
benefit even those purchasers who neglect to search for prior inter-
ests, for the court may find that a reasonable search would have been 
futile anyway. 
No Massachusetts decisions under the UCC have examined the issue 
of "seriously misleading" error. However, some standards have emerged 
from other jurisdictions. In the case of In re Hodgin, 24 debtor had 
executed a security agreement covering a 1969 Toyota, but creditor's 
financing statement referred only to a "1969 Fiat." Over the creditor's 
objections, the trustee in bankruptcy of the debtor requested authority 
to sell the car free of encumbrances. The referee held that "such in-
accurate description was a major rather than minor error, and resulted 
in 'no filing at all.' The instrument filed was completely misleading; 
rather than inviting further investigation by a prudent searcher, it 
foreclosed additional inquiry. "25 (Emphasis added.) Accordingly, the 
financing statement was invalidated. 
Bank of North America v. Bank of Nutley,26 cited by the Court in 
Still Associates, involved mistakes by both plaintiff and defendant. De-
fendant had repossessed a car under a security agreement perfected on 
March 24, 1965. His handwritten financing statement, however, identi-
fied debtor incorrectly as Joseph "Kaplas" instead of "Kaplan," and the 
statement was filed alphabetically according to the erroneous identifica-
tion. Plaintiff brought an action for conversion of the automobile, re-
lying on a security agreement which was perfected after the reposses-
sion. His financing statement, however, contained a one-digit serial 
number error in its description of the car. On cross-motions for sum-
mary judgment, the New Jersey court ruled that defendant's error in 
identifying the debtor invalidated his financing statement because it 
deprived subsequent creditors of the opportunity to discover his se-
23 I d. at 564, I 09 N .E.2d at 146. 
24 Bankruptcy No.69-1217 (W.D. Okla., Feb. 4,1970), 7 UCCRep. Serv. 612. 
25 Id. at 616. 
26 94 N.J. Super. 220,227 A.2d535 (1967). 
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curity interest in the carY On the other hand, plaintiff's financing 
statement was found to be valid because the serial number error was 
deemed "a minor error which is not seriously misleading." 
Other courts have held financing statements to be invalid for errors 
of omission. A financing statement which said "see attached descrip-
tion" was held insufficient when no description was attached,28 and a 
financing statement containing only the serial number "1968 COF 
4000D-35971-G288307," with no further description, was held invalid 
against the 1968 International tractor true~ to which it was intended 
to refer.29 In the latter case, the referee reasoned that the year and serial 
number alone might sufficiently identify the item from others of the 
same type, but that such information does not indicate the type or 
describe the item of collateral within the meaning of UCC §9-402(1). A 
searcher seeing the serial number alone would have no idea as to what 
kind of property might be covered.30 
After finding that the one-digit error in Still Associates was not 
seriously misleading on its face, the Supreme Judicial Court went a 
step further: 
There is no showing here that the defendant was prejudiced by 
the minor error made by plaintiff's agent, or that he would have 
been had he made the inquiry which the Code contemplates. In 
circumstances such as these, where the error is not on its face suf-
ficiently serious to invalidate the financing statement, it appears 
proper to us to require the party seeking to invalidate it under 
§9-402(5) to make some showing of actual prejudice. 31 
The term prejudice, which was used twice, does not appear anywhere 
in UCC §9-402 or in the comment to that section. Its use in the Court's 
opinion, however, suggests that if a defendant can prove he reasonably 
relied on the erroneous description, then the financing statement may 
be invalid as to him, despite the fact that the error is not a seriously 
misleading one. 32 
27 Similarly, in In re Smith, 205 F. Supp. 27 (E.D. Pa. 1962), a financing statement 
which did not contain debtor's address was held to be invalid because it deprived subse-
quent creditors of information necessary for inquiry. 
28 In re Antekeier, Bankruptcy No. 32,616B (W.D. Mich., Sept. 3, 1969), 6 VCC Rep. 
Serv. 1027. 
29 In re Richards, Bankruptcy No. 33, 669B (W.D. Mich., July 29, 1970), 7 VCC Rep. 
Serv. 1378. 
30 compare with In re Bengtson, Bankruptcy No. 5483 (D. Conn., Dec. 15, 1965), 3 VCC 
Rep. Serv. 283. Debtor was an appliance dealer, and a serial number in the financing 
statement obviously referred to some appliance in his inventory which could be identi-
fied on request. The serial number reference was held sufficient because no one should 
have been seriously misled. 
31 1970 Mass. Adv. Sh. 245,247,267 N.E.2d217, 218. 
32 The Supreme Judicial Court citoo Eastern Acceptance Corp. v. Camden Trust Co., 
33 N.J. 227, 163 A.2d 134 (1960), in support of the requirement of actual prejudice, but 
that case is not really on point. It was decided before the VCC was enacted, and the only 
language in the opinion which is relevant simply states: "[T]here was no question as to 
the identity of the automobile which the parties properly intended to cover by the trust 
receipt, and the defendant was not prejudiced by and is in no just position to reap any 
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The "actual prejudice" test seems to be a form of the doctrine of es-
toppel, which was intended to supplement the code through Section 
1-103: 
Unless displaced by the particular provisions of this chapter, the 
principles of law and equity, including the law merchant and 
the law relative to capacity to contract, principal and agent, es-
toppel, fraud, misrepresentation, duress, coercion, mistake, bank-
ruptcy, or other validating or invalidating cause shall supple-
ment its provisions. 
Estoppel is the ancient equitable doctrine which may be invoked to bar 
a person from pleading the truth when he has made a representation to 
the contrary. The doctrine is invoked where there is a representation or 
conduct by one person which induces another to do something which 
he would not otherwise have done, and which causes him harm, in cir-
cumstances where the first person should reasonably have known that 
such consequences would follow. 33 
The notice-filing system of Article 9 lends itself rather easily to the 
application of estoppel. The secured party makes a representation of 
fact in his financing statement with the knowledge that other inter-
ested persons will rely on it. When the statement contains an error 
which is attributable to the secured party's negligence, as was the case 
in Still Associates, the only element of estoppel which remains to be 
proved at trial is detrimental reliance. The effect of estoppel in this 
context would be to prevent a secured party from alleging a security 
interest in collateral which was not adequately described. The essential 
issue in estoppel is not whether the prudent searcher would have been 
misled, but whether the person who did search was in fact misled. In 
this respect, estoppel is different from the "misleading error" test of 
UCC §9-402(5). The emphasis is not on the severity of error, but on 
what the searcher actually believed. 
There are no cases to date which have applied the doctrine of estop-
pel to descriptions of collateral under the UCC. In fact, there are rela-
tively few cases challenging the sufficiency of financing statements, 
and none of them has involved actual reliance on a financing statement 
error. Nevertheless, the inclusion of the word prejudice in Still Asso-
ciates may indicate that the Court was tracing the elements of estoppel 
on its own initiative, and this may foreshadow a new application of 
the doctrine within Article 9. 
In the course of its opinion in Still Associates, the Supreme Judicial 
Court said that its 1924 decision in Wise v. Kennedy is no loqger to be 
followed. It is submitted that Wise should have ·been distinguished on 
its facts and not overruled. The debtor in Wise was an agent for the 
sale of Jordan touring cars. Defendant claimed title to one of the cars 
advantage from the inadvertence." Id. at 236, 163 A.2d at 139. The issue of reliance on a 
financing statement error was not even discussed in the opinion. 
"Nelson v. Wentworth, 243 Mass. 377,379, 137 N.E.2d646, 647 (1923). 
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under a mortgage whose description of collateral referred to "one new 
Jordan touring car number 6552." The actual serial number was 6557. 
Plaintiff, who had purchased the car from the debtor-dealer in good 
faith and without actual notice of defendant's mortgage, brought an 
action in replevin to recover the car, but the trial court found for de-
fendant. On appeal, the Supreme Judicial Court held that within the 
automobile dealership context, automobiles of the same class can be 
distinguished with reasonable certainty only by serial number, and 
that a filed mortgage statement covering 6552 did not give reasonable 
notice as to 6557. 
In overruling Wise the Supreme Judicial Court has invited confu-
sion. The Court seems to have assumed that Wise stood for the proposi-
tion that a one-digit error in listing a serial number will always in-
validate a particular filing. Such an assumption would be incorrect. 
Wise concerned a dealer in Jordan cars, and dealers can be expected 
to handle numerous cars for a particular manufacturer. Particularly 
today, a person buying from a dealer might well assume that some-
times the dealer receives shipments of automobiles with successive 
serial numbers. Accordingly, the purchaser might reasonably feel no 
alarm at seeing a notice of encumbrance listing an automobile with a 
serial number very similar to that on his car. The vehicle in Still Asso-
ciates, on the other hand, belonged to a private party, and that private 
party was almost cetain not to have two "1967 Dodge 6 cyl. D-100 
pickup[ s ]" with ten-digit serial numbers identical except for the last 
digit. The Supreme Judicial Court should have distinguished Wise, 
for if a similar situation arose tomorrow, it would seem unreasonable 
to hold as a matter of law that "number 6552" is a description which 
gives fair notice of an interest in number 6557. 
The notice-filing principles which were established in National 
Cash Register and confirmed in Still Associates cast doubt on the one 
other Massachusetts decision concerning descriptive requirements 
under Article 9. In Annawan Mills, Inc. v. Northeastern Fibers Co.,34 
defendant claimed a security interest in a cotton waste product known 
as cotton linters, under a financing statement and security agreement 
which described the collateral as "Cotton Waste and Proceeds." Plain-
tiff attached the cotton linters under trustee process, claiming that the 
description of collateral in defendant's financing statement was not 
sufficient to cover the linters. The trial court admitted expert testimony 
to the effect that in the textile industry, cotton waste and cotton linters 
meant two different things.35 Cotton waste is a waste produced from 
cotton mills, whereas cotton linters is a by-product of the manufacture 
of cottonseed oil. On the basis of that testimony, the trial court found 
for plaintiff. The appellate division agreed that the financing state-
ment was insufficient to perfect an interest in cotton linters. 
34 26Mass.App.Dec.ll5(1963). 
35 UCC §1-205(5) provides: "An applicable usage of trade in the place where any 
part of performance is to occur shall be used in interpreting the agreement as to that part 
of the performance." 
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The appellate division, however, did not properly consider whether 
"Cotton Waste and Proceeds" indicates a type of collateral which in-
cludes cotton linters for notice-filing purposes. It was simply assumed 
that once the meaning of cotton linters could be distinguished from 
the meaning of cotton waste, the description of collateral was insuffi-
cient. Annawan Mills was never appealed to the Supreme Judicial 
Court, but two weeks after the Annawan decision, the Supreme Judicial 
Court handed down its opinion in National Cash Register. It is sub-
mitted that the appellate division may well have applied the notice-
filing principles to reach a different result if National Cash Register 
had been decided earlier. 
It is appropriate here to mention a related issue which is not direct-
ly involved in Still Associates. The UCC is intended to permit "con-
tinued expansion of commercial practices through custom, usage and 
agreement of the parties."36 Two examples of such expansion which 
relate to the standards for description of collateral are inventory financ-
ing and the use of the term proceeds. 
Inventory financing is the practice of securing a debt with an inter-
est in debtor's inventory, even though the iJIVentory is changing from 
day to day. This practice recognizes that the goods which cmjstitute 
inventory at any given moment are flowing from manufacturer to con-
sumer, but that the value of a debtor's inventory will usually remain 
relatively constant. The difficulty in drafting such an arrangement is 
in describing the collateral broadly enough so that any goods of value 
will be included in the security interest, yet specifically enough so that 
the agreement is enforceable. The description of collateral would 
necessarily include an after-acquired property clause in order to cover 
those goods purchased in replacement of goods sold. The object is to 
eliminate the need for a series of secured transactions by permitting 
collateral to be identified with broad descriptive terms. 
The difficulty with broad descriptive terms, however, is that they 
are not always so broad as they would seem. UCC §9-109, for example, 
gives several broad definitions. Consumer Goods include goods used for 
personal, household, or family purposes. Inventory includes goods 
which are held for sale or lease, as well as raw materials, work in pro-
cess, or materials used or consumed in a business. Equipment includes 
goods used for business purposes. the definitions are intended to be 
mutually exclusive,37 and superficially they would seem to be tailored 
for use in inventory financing arrangements. The problem with these 
terms, however, is indicated in a comment to UCC §9-109: 
In borderline cases-a physician's car or a farmer's jeep which 
might be either consumer goods or equipment-the principal use 
to which the property is put should be considered as determina-
tive. Goods can fall into different classes at different times: a radio 
is inventory in the hands of a dealer and consumer goods in the 
hands of a householder.38 
36 UCC§I-102(2)(b). 
37 UCC§9-109,Comment2. 
38 Ibid. 
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A creditor who uses such terms will have the burden of proving the 
primary use in cases of doubt. Perhaps the safest course, and the fairest 
to other interested persons, is to supplement the broad terms with spe-
cific examples and locations wherever possible. The description in 
National Cash Register, quoted in full earlier, is a model of this ap-
proach. The Supreme Judicial Court found the description broad 
enough to include the cash register, which plaintiff agreed did not have 
to be specifically described. "The agreement covers 'all contents of lun-
cheonette including equipment such as,' which we think covers all 
those contents and does not mean 'equipment, to wit.' "39 (Emphasis 
added.) 
The use of the term proceeds presents a similar problem. UCC §9-203 
(l)(b) provides that "in describing collateral, the word 'proceeds' is 
sufficient without further description to cover proceeds of any char-
acter,'' and UCC §9-306 defines proceeds as "whatever is received when 
collateral or proceeds is sold, exchanged, collected or otherwise dis-
posed of." When collateral is continually being bought and sold, use 
of the term proceeds in describing collateral will protect the secured 
party by giving him an interest in whatever is received for goods which 
are sold. The difficulty with proceeds as a descriptive term, however, 
is that it does not indicate a type of collateral within the meaning of 
UCC §9-402. Incubating chickens, for example, could be the proceeds 
of an automobile if the seller wished to barter with a chicken farmer, 
but the prudent searcher would not necessarily be alerted in such a 
situation to inquire into the title of chickens.40 
The commercial utility of inventory financing and proceeds clauses 
is that they make credit easier to obtain for small businesses, and cor-
relatively, that they protect the lender who might not otherwise extend 
credit to marginal enterprises. For that reason they are sound develop-
ments. The problem which the courts must face is to balance commer-
cial needs against the traditional standards of notice and fair play 
which the law and equity have always supported. 
The decision in Still Associates confirms that the requirements for 
description of collateral in financing statements will be governed by 
the notice-filing theory in Massachusetts, and that UCC §§9-110 and 
9-402 will be liberally construed. It also appears that a minor error of 
39 346Mass. 255.259, 191 N.E.2d471, 473 (1963). 
40 "What information should a claim to 'proceeds' convey? The basic requirement of 
section 9-402(1) is that a financing statement shall indicate the types or describe the 
items of collateral. Where a description covers 'proceeds' it does not conform to this 
requirement and to the fundamental notice-giving purpose of the Code; indeed, one 
would question whether it satisfied section 9-402(1) if it were not that the sample form 
of financing statement in section 9-402(3) sanctions so uninformative a description of 
collateral. What may be the proceeds of a dealer's sale of, say, a new automobile, and 
what notice does a financing statement really give to the public if only the word 'pro-
ceeds' is used? Obviously, the proceeds of a new automobile may be cash, an open ac-
count, chattel paper, or a used car taken in trade; but, depending on the breadth of the 
dealer's business lines or his courage or imagination, the proceeds taken in trade might 
also be a used truck or mobile home, a used refrigerator, used furniture, new or used 
clothing or jewelry, or conceivably incubating chickens." Kripke, Suggestions for 
Clarifying Article 9: Intangibles, Proceeds and Priorities, 41 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 687, 705 
(1966). 
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description will have to be misleading enough to confuse the prudent 
title searcher before the financing statement will be held invalid. This 
objective test, however, may yield to the doctrine of estoppel in cases 
where one of the parties can prove actual prejudice by virtue of an 
otherwise minor error in a financing statement. 
jAMES C. DoNNELLY, jR. 
30
Annual Survey of Massachusetts Law, Vol. 1971 [1971], Art. 8
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/asml/vol1971/iss1/8
